Absence of the “Shadow Key Figure”: Why Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Economic Policies are Hitting a Wall

Why are Japan’s economic and national security policies becoming increasingly unstable under the administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi? This article argues that the cause lies not in ideology or institutional design, but in the weakening of the “informal human networks” that have long sustained Japanese governance.

While the Takaichi Cabinet aims to integrate foreign policy and national security with economic strategy, her economic measures are likely to fail. Those who understand the true nature of Japanese organizations know that success depends not on formal systems, but on invisible personal relationships. In the Takaichi administration, these foundations are remarkably fragile.

Such internal dynamics are often lost in translation when reported in English. Consequently, it is extremely difficult for those in the English-speaking world to grasp the reality of the Takaichi administration’s current standing.

1. “Aide-Driven Politics” and the Vacuum Left by Takaya Imai

Japanese media outlets, such as Kyodo News, report that Takaichi is heavily relying on bureaucrats from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to follow the “Abe roadmap.” Currently, the administration’s core includes METI elites such as Yuji Iida (Executive Secretary to the PM), Kozo Saeki (Cabinet Public Relations Secretary), and Tadashi Mogi, the Chief Secretary to Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara.

However, a crucial piece of the puzzle is missing: Takaya Imai. Known as the “Shadow Prime Minister” during the Abe administration, Imai integrated economic policy with diplomacy, orchestrating Japan’s unique “Supply-Side Economics”—a strategy that fused national security with the revitalization of manufacturing. Prime Minister Takaichi, however, has distanced herself from Imai, disregarding his advice and calling a snap election with only a handful of close aides like Minoru Kihara.

2. The Failure of “Shadow Key Figures” in Japanese Organizations

In Western nations, institutions are generally expected to operate based on clear goals and policies. In Japan, however, there is a cultural aversion to overt inter-agency coordination. Instead, “Shadow Key Figures” are required to handle the messy business of behind-the-scenes interests and adjustments.

When a “hub” like Imai disappears, Japan’s policy packages—which are often not logically codified but managed through personal influence—begin to collapse. Currently, while Takaichi maintains communication with Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama, she remains distant from Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, leaving the administration without a functional bridge to the broader bureaucracy.

3. Bureaucratic Coldness and the “Trump Risk”

Even more serious is the growing “bureaucratic exodus” from the Takaichi administration. METI has taken a cautious stance, while the Foreign Ministry has been reluctant to provide proactive support on sensitive issues like Taiwan. One anonymous government official described Takaichi’s policies as a “social experiment,” coldly suggesting that if they fail, the responsibility lies solely with the voters who chose her.

In this environment, Japan must face an unpredictable second Trump administration. Donald Trump often uses national security as a bargaining chip in economic deals, a tactic that requires “strategic decoding” through high-level personal connections. However, the minister currently in charge of U.S. negotiations, Ryosei Akazawa, is a close ally of former PM Shigeru Ishiba and lacks a deep bond of trust with Takaichi.

4. The Gap Between “Quasi-Presidential” Expectations and Reality

Takaichi’s popularity stems partly from the public’s desire for a “quasi-presidential” figure—someone who can bypass complex coordination and solve problems as if by magic. Yet, the Japanese system is not designed to support a strong, top-down leader, no matter how talented aides like Iida or Tadashi Mogi may be.

This disconnect between the public’s high expectations and the administration’s fragile power base is the greatest political risk in Japan today. Unless Prime Minister Takaichi can transition from “personal management” to “institutional management,” her economic policies will inevitably reach a breaking point.